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ABSTRACT
The questions concerning Adam Smith’s religious views and his purported support for
utilitarianism have each generated a substantial literature. In this thesis, I propose a response to
the first of these problems which I believe also helps resolve the second one. First, I argue that
Smith’s references to God in The Theory of Moral Sentiments reflect his sincere theological
commitments, not merely his account of the psychology of religious belief or his attempt to
avoid charges of atheism. I then show that Smith conceives of God as a utilitarian creator who
designed our moral sentiments so that they would most effectively promote the utility of
humanity as a whole. I combine these two claims to develop an interpretation of Smith as a twolevel utilitarian where the Impartial Spectator determines the morality of the lower level and God
does so for the higher one.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Adam Smith is often credited with developing a sentimentalist ethical theory in his work
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790), in which an action’s moral worth depends on whether it
would garner the sympathy of an informed but unbiased individual called the “impartial
spectator”. The impartial spectator here is not meant to be a real person but rather is an
imaginative construct we can call upon to gain insight about what we and others ought to do.
Smith believes considering the reaction of an impartial spectator allows us to abstract from our
particular perspective and properly judge actions. Smith’s system departs from those of many
other philosophers because it takes our actual moral emotions, and not theoretical, rationallyderived principles, as its starting point. Still, as we shall see, Smith at certain points strongly
indicates that he believes that an almighty Deity designed our moral faculties, and that it did so
primarily to maximize human happiness. In my paper, I argue that these tenets do not stand in
tension with his sentimentalism, but that they serve different roles in his moral system.
Specifically, I interpret Smith as embracing two-level, also known as indirect,
utilitarianism, a theory which holds that the best world is the one which contains the greatest
total amount of happiness, but that aiming directly at maximizing aggregate utility is often an
ineffective way of achieving that end. Richard Hare’s original version of this view argued that
the utilitarian level of decision making was appropriate for some circumstances but that we
should rely on various intuitions and moral rules instead at other times1. Smith largely reserves
the utilitarian level of decision making for God, who acts only in order to promote the general
welfare, and recommends the impartial spectator as our best means of approximating God’s

Price, Anthony, “Richard Mervyn Hare”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
1

2
judgment. Because Smith defines morality in terms of what is the proper target of our positive
moral sentiments, the content of morality is equivalent to the sum total of the impartial
spectator’s decisions. However, we only ought to rely on this spectator because we cannot
perceive the full consequences of our actions, and following the impartial spectator allows us
typically to produce beneficial results despite our imperfect knowledge. One way to understand
the thesis I am arguing for here is to say that propriety establishes our morality but utility
justifies it. Admittedly, this view doesn’t make Smith utilitarian in a traditional sense, but it
means that he leans much further in that direction than he appears to at first.
While other scholars have mentioned this interpretation as a possible resolution to the
disagreements surrounding Smith’s stance on these questions, I am not aware of any previous
effort to fully develop this approach and defend both its religious and ethical sides2. To do this, I
begin by presenting some of the passages on utility that some people have taken as evidence that
his views on the topic are inconsistent. Then I show why we should take Smith’s religious belief
seriously and explain how it helps form the foundation for my understanding of his ethical
theory. Finally, I respond to objections which present Smith as non-theological and those which
conclude he is an anti-utilitarian.
First, it is worth prefacing my interpretation of Smith by comparing it to a reading of
Joseph Butler, Smith’s predecessor and influence. According to Robert Louden’s article
“Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism” (1995), Butler believes that the standard that God uses to

R.F. Stalley, for example, writes in “Adam Smith and the Theory of Punishment”, that Smith’s
position on utility “is in keeping with his general view that nature is providentially ordered. Its
‘Author’ intends the happiness of mankind but wisely has not left us with the task of working out
how to achieve this. He has, instead, endowed us with natural instincts which lead us to act in
ways likely to produce our happiness.” (p. 7)
2
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determine the moral truth sometimes diverges from the process by which humans ought to make
moral judgments. Specifically, Louden contends that Butler’s apparent deontological
commitments only describe our moral psychology and actually cloak his deeper philosophical
support for utilitarianism. As Louden writes, “Butler’s ethics is best viewed as a theological
version of what has been called ‘oblique’ or ‘indirect’ utilitarianism, according to which human
beings were created by God in such a manner (and for the reason) that they will produce the
greatest amount of happiness by not trying to produce the greatest amount of happiness.” (p.
267) Because we are fallible creatures, we often fail to bring about our intended ends, whereas
God’s perfection ensures that every goal he has necessarily becomes reality. God can therefore
foresee how our attempts to maximize utility may backfire and how non-utilitarian tendencies
can counter-intuitively lead to the best possible consequences. I see Smith as advancing a
similar, albeit somewhat more moderate, line of argument, by describing our moral psychology
as largely but not entirely utilitarian and accounting for the deviations in the way that Butler
does. If Louden is right about Butler, the type of reasoning I ascribe to Smith would at least have
some historical precedent and therefore would gain additional plausibility by helping fit him into
the philosophical thinking of his time.

2

UTILITY AND THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR

One potential issue with relying on the impartial spectator as a moral standard is that, as
Smith points out, it can contradict itself. This raises the question of which of its judgments we
ought to favor when it does so. I will argue that, in at least some important cases, Smith asks us
to decide by figuring out which will maximize utility. Something’s utility, for Smith, refers to the
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totality of positive consequences it will produce. An object or course of action has great utility if
it tends to improve people’s lives in the long run, and lacks utility if it has no effect or a negative
one. Now, let us examine the way utility typically influences the impartial spectator’s pattern of
judgment. Smith addresses this issue most directly in response to his friend and contemporary
David Hume, who thinks that we determine an action’s moral worth based on whether it was
beneficial or detrimental to society. Here, Smith demurs, asserting that “it is not the view of this
utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and
disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the
beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are
originally and essentially different from this perception” (IV.2.3)3. Smith gives two arguments
for this belief. First, he claims that we evaluate inanimate objects based on how useful they are to
us, and it would be inappropriate to judge people’s conduct by the same metric we use for our
tools.
Additionally, Smith maintains that we often praise people when they display their genius
or exercise impressive self-control even when we are unable to ascertain how they are helping
society by doing so. For example, we might be impressed with the strong will it took for
someone to break a cigarette addiction, an act which mainly helps themselves and has negligible
or nonexistent effects on others. Unlike people today, Smith would count our approbation of the
person who quit smoking as an example of our noticing their moral virtue. Such a judgment
makes little sense on utilitarian grounds, but can be explained by Smith’s belief that the impartial

While Smith doesn’t mention the impartial spectator by name in that statement, when Smith
refers to “our” moral sentiments without specifying that they are the sentiments of a particular
individual, we can take him to be describing aspects of an impartial spectator.
3
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spectator deems someone’s response to their situation proper when he sympathizes with it, or
when he feels he would have responded the same way if he were in their situation.
Smith also bases his theory of justice on the reaction of an impartial spectator rather than
on a utility calculus. Utilitarian theorists both in his time and today hold that we should only
punish someone if doing so will promote the well-being of society, either by preventing the
subject of the punishment from committing crimes in the future or by deterring others from
engaging in similar acts. Smith rejects this idea, insisting that “it is not a regard to the
preservation of society which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed
against individuals” (II.ii.3.10). Instead, he grounds punishment on our sentiment of resentment.
According to Smith, “proper resentment for injustice attempted, or actually committed, is the
only motive which, in the eyes of the impartial spectator, can justify hurting or disturbing in any
respect the happiness of our neighbour. To do so from any other motive is itself a violation of the
laws of justice” (VI.ii.intro.1). Smith defines resentment as a hostile passion directed at those
who have intentionally and without good cause harmed us or those we sympathize with.
Resentment drives us to harm the target of this emotion specifically for how they wronged their
victim, and in this way is more active than hatred, which merely prompts us to wish ill on its
target.
Of course, Smith does not believe that we are justified in punishing anyone we happen to
resent. Due to our self-centered nature, we often resent people far more strongly than we ought to
and are thus tempted to engage in unduly extreme acts of retribution. For instance, we might
resent someone who bullied us as a child, and want to ruin their life as an adult. This might feel
right at the time given the strength of your memories about how they treated you, but would be
criticized by an impartial spectator witnessing your reaction, who recognizes that they probably
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changed since you last knew them and no longer deserve your retaliation. Just punishment flows
specifically from proper resentment, which is defined as resentment that an impartial spectator
could go along with. Nonetheless, this defense of punishment looks backwards from a utilitarian
perspective. The fact that someone merits resentment, even among impartial spectators, does not
necessarily mean that punishing them would be useful, and a penal policy might in some
situations improve public safety by sanctioning acts which fail to provoke our resentment.
Insofar as the impartial spectator focuses on retribution for past misdeeds rather than mitigating
future harm, it is not aiming at utilitarian ends.
At the same time, Smith often supports our sentiments by appealing to their utility and
even in some places recommends violating his own principles of justice if doing so has positive
consequences. For example, Smith explains how a centinel (military guard) who falls asleep on
their watch can rightly be executed for the greater good. As R.F. Stalley notes in “Adam Smith
and the Theory of Punishment”, Smith’s analysis of military laws seems to stand in tension with
his earlier conception of proper penalties. Smith writes:
A centinel, for example, suffers death by the laws of war, because such carelessness
might endanger the whole army. This severity may, upon many occasions, appear
necessary, and, for that reason just and proper. When the preservation of an individual is
inconsistent with the safety of a multitude, nothing can be more just than that the many
be preferred to the one. (II.ii.3.11)
Importantly, this action does not match the dictates of an impartial spectator’s moral
sentiments. Smith admits that “the thought of this crime does not naturally excite any such
resentment, as would prompt us to take such dreadful revenge. A man of humanity must recollect
himself, must make an effort, and exert his whole firmness and resolution, before he can bring
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himself either to inflict it, or to go along with it when it is inflicted by others” (II.ii.3.11). In
other words, when our sense of what a person deserves conflicts with the needs of society, we
may be obligated to overcome our internal resistance for the sake of the greater good. One might
be tempted to dismiss this case as a single exception with few implications for the rest of Smith’s
theory. However, Smith also allows utility to trump propriety in more common situations. In one
passage, he discusses the squeamishness some of us display right before carrying out or
witnessing a harsh punishment, even one which is justified. Smith explains that at this point, “the
generous and humane … are disposed to pardon and forgive (the criminal), and to save him
from that punishment, which in all their cool hours they had considered as the retribution due to
such crimes. Here, therefore, they have occasion to call to their assistance the general interest of
society” (II.ii.3.7). Unlike the centinel, those being executed here have merited profound
resentment for their conduct. Yet the “generous and humane” people Smith describes have lost
that hostility to the criminals they are judging, and would, if they acted on their current
sentiments, spare the person on death row. Smith clearly disapproves of that decision, claiming it
is motivated by a “weak and partial humanity” as opposed to the “enlarged compassion” which
drives justice. Sentiment has force in both directions here, since, despite being impartial
spectators, the witness’ sympathy is torn between the lenient and harsh options. Smith grants
utilitarian considerations, which call for executing the criminal, the final say.
Utility also resolves the systematic inconsistency in our sentiments Smith describes
concerning intentional and accidental harms. In part two, section three of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, Smith argues that our theoretical commitment to judge others’ morals based on their
motives conflicts with our tendency to admire and condemn people more strongly for their
successful endeavors than for their failed ones. He begins the section by declaring that “to the
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intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or
hurtfulness of the design, all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind,
which can justly be bestowed upon any action, must ultimately belong” (II.iii.intro.3). Here,
Smith takes himself to be presenting an uncontroversial, defining feature of a “just approbation”,
claiming that we all agree that it is always wrong to allow luck to influence our decisions on
these matters.
Smith goes on to describe how, in individual circumstances, the unintended consequences
of our actions often impact the credit or criticism society gives us. He writes that:
though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and beneficent, on the one
hand, or ever so improper and malevolent, on the other, yet, if they fail in producing their
effects, his merit seems imperfect in the one case, and his demerit incomplete in the
other. Nor is this irregularity of sentiment felt only by those who are immediately
affected by the consequences of any action. It is felt, in some measure, even by the
impartial spectator. (II.iii.2.1)
This inconsistency shapes our legal system, causing the attempt to commit a crime to be
punished far less severely (if it is punished at all) than actually committing a crime is. Our
tendency to react in this fashion also affects popular opinion even in situations where the law
does not apply. It explains, for example, why one military leader gets celebrated for victorious
missions whereas another one with identical skill but who lost their battles due to misfortune can
be hated by the nation.
After noting this irregularity, one might expect Smith to end the section by reproaching
our propensity to judge one’s behavior by its consequences and reminding us of the principle
stated at the beginning of the chapter. Rather than do so, interestingly, Smith opts to endorse this
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aspect of our morality. We can already tell that Smith does not consider it to simply be a human
error because he attributes it to the impartial spectator as well. Given that the impartial spectator
is purportedly the moral standard throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the fact that it acts
inconsistently in this manner raises important issues for Smith’s philosophy. As Geoffrey SayreMcCord describes the problem in his article “Sentiments and Spectators” (2010), “the various
irregularities all look as if they disqualify those who suffer them as setting the standard for our
moral judgments” (p. 15). Sayre-McCord’s article explores the extent to which these
irregularities threaten the impartial spectator’s value as an arbiter of morality4. He concludes that
the irregularities’ usefulness redeems them in the spectator’s own eyes, and since the spectator is
the only moral standard we have, it passes the highest test we can put it to. My account, by
contrast, provides Smith with a source of moral authority which is superior to the impartial
spectator and can render judgment upon it. I will argue that Smith considers God to be this type
of moral authority. God approves of the impartial spectator, irregularities and all, because it
serves his purpose of inducing us to make the most utility-maximizing decisions. This top-down
defense of the impartial spectator is stronger than the self-referential one Sayre-McCord
suggests.
Smith gives several reasons why rewarding and punishing people based on the outcome
of their actions, rather than by their intentions, leads to salutary results. First, he argues that it is
impossible to know anyone’s true intentions. Attempting to discern this information would force
us to pry illegitimately into people’s minds and cause even innocent people to worry that they
will be suspected of wrongdoing (II.iii.3.2). Secondly, Smith believes that valuing success over

Although I introduce Sayre-McCord’s article here to suggest a potential issue with the impartial
spectator’s irregularity, I cover the article in greater depth later in this thesis.
4
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perceived effort incentivizes everyone to work harder, knowing that they cannot earn praise by
convincing society that they tried to do good (II.iii.3.3). Lastly, the shame attached to causing
accidental injury encourages care when engaging with others and reduces negligent harm
(II.iii.3.4). In providing this account, Smith is not merely admitting that our deviation from
ethical principle comes with some positive side effects; he is attempting to show why it is a
crucial part of our morality. He concludes that “That necessary rule of justice, therefore, that men
in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions, is
founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit or
demerits, which at first sight appears so absurd and unaccountable” (II.iii.3.2). Combining this
statement with Smith’s earlier insistence that people only earn praise or blame for their intentions
indicates that he thinks we, at least in some situations, ought to treat others in ways they do not
deserve if doing so will produce desirable consequences. Accepting this interpretation would
push The Theory of Moral Sentiments much closer to utilitarianism.

3

GOD, HUMAN NATURE, AND INDIRECT UTILITARIANISM

So on the one hand, we see that the impartial spectator, whose judgments often appear to
be Smith’s ultimate criterion of right and wrong, does not determine the moral value of actions
mainly by analyzing their utility. On the other hand, Smith frequently allows utility to either
justify or override the impartial spectator. How do we reconcile these aspects of his philosophy,
and to what extent should we consider him a utilitarian? I propose that we can best understand
Smith’s views on this issue by examining his comments on religion. Smith incorporates
teleological and theological language throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and suggests
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that we construct the impartial spectator out of characteristics given to us by God. The Deity
Smith refers to is a utilitarian, and designed us to promote the collective happiness of our
species. Our concept of the impartial spectator aids us in this effort, causing us to adopt the
moral attitudes which would most effectively further our welfare. We, however, do not always
consciously pursue the ends God sets out for us, and Smith does not advise us to. Thus, utility
acts largely indirectly in Smith’s theory, underwriting actions which we perform for a plethora of
complex reasons. I hope to demonstrate that this two-layered reading of utility’s place in Smith’s
work both fits in directly with Smith’s idea of God and accommodates his apparently
incompatible positions with respect to utilitarianism.
Smith draws on God largely to provide an origin story for our moral sentiments.
Although most of his book is devoted to a descriptive account of our psychological tendencies to
judge each other, Smith does not think that these tendencies just emerged contingently through a
process of evolutionary or cultural development. Instead, he maintains that “Upon whatever we
suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason,
upon an original instinct, called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it
cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life” (III.5.6)
While Smith doesn’t explicitly refer to God here, he implies that some higher power designed
our mind and cares about our fate. Elsewhere, Smith more clearly specifies God as our creator
and adds that he has benevolent aims. As Smith writes:
the happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been
the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into
existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity
which we naturally ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract
consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the examination of the
works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against
misery. But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily
pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may
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therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in
our power the plan of providence (III.3.5.7)
This statement about God is still a very generic one, and does not imply that Smith is committed
to any particular religious sect. Although the question of what Smith’s personal religious beliefs
were remains controversial, his claims here and in the rest of The Theory of Moral Sentiments are
consistent with any monotheistic belief system. Also, we can begin to see here how Smith's
belief that the world is divinely ordered connects his moral psychology to an indirectly utilitarian
normative theory. Since God intended our moral faculties, which judge based on many other
factors besides utility, to be “the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind”,
our actions’ moral worth can derive from their utility even if we judge them using our
sentiments. Smith fleshes out this religious strain in his philosophy by detailing how the more
sophisticated elements of our morality helps us more closely mirror God’s judgment. As
explained earlier, Smith believes our moral sentiments are most reliable when they are filtered
through the perspective of an impartial spectator. This spectator expresses characteristically
human attitudes when confronted with praiseworthy or blameworthy actions, but does so free of
the personal biases and unrelated emotional forces which distort our initial reactions. To Smith,
these advantages earn the impartial spectator the titles of “vicegerent of God” (III.5.6) and
“demigod within the breast” (III.2.32). Although one can interpret these honorifics as nothing
more than hyperbolic compliments for a mundane way to refine our moral perspicacity, they
might cohere better with Smith’s aforementioned views on religion if we take them to indicate
that there is a genuine connection between God and the impartial spectator. If Smith sees human
morality in general as a gift from above, the notion that the purest expression of our moral
sentiments contains a sacred aspect is a natural next step.
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General rules are the other tool Smith suggests for correcting our moral instincts, and he
relates these to God as well. According to Smith, “those important rules of morality are the laws
and commands of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors
of their duty” (III.5.2). Like the impartial spectator, these rules acquire their holy imprimatur
from our sentiments. They are formed inductively, “from the experience we have had of the
effects which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us” (III.4.9), not proven
through reason or derived from first principles. Also like the impartial spectator, their main
purpose is to enable us to act on our consciences without interference from temperament or selfinterest. When the Deity created us, he instilled in us the capacity to sympathize with others,
which we use to measure the propriety of their feelings and actions. The pressure society
imposes on us to behave properly typically conduces to our aggregate well-being, as God
intended. Yet sometimes, due to a lack of knowledge or unwarranted preconceptions, an
individual acquires a reputation they do not deserve. In such cases, “an appeal lies from his
sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the
supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great
judge and arbiter of their conduct” (III.2.32). By imagining ourselves from this point of view and
determining the extent to which we sympathize with the action we performed, we render as
divine a verdict as is possible for us.
The impartial spectator is imperfect despite being formed from God-given sentiments.
Smith is careful to clarify that the impartial spectator is, “like the demigods of the poets, though
partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal extraction” (II.2.33). Even this spectator can be
swayed by the opinion of the masses, and, as we have seen, contains irregularities which threaten
to make it an inconsistent judge. Our general rules, too, cannot always tell us what we ought to
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do. They excel at keeping us from falling below basic standards of decency or committing
genuine injustices, but are insufficiently precise to decide the harder ethical dilemmas. In fact,
Smith admits that “the general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine
what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, or gratitude, of friendship, are in many
respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that
it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them” (III.6.8). After
exhausting our resources for moral judgment, we may still be uncertain about what we ought to
do or whether one of our past actions was right. In these times, our only option is to “appeal to a
still higher tribunal, to that of the all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be
deceived, and whose judgments can never be perverted” (III.2.33). Possibly more than anywhere
else, Smith here rejects the idea that the impartial spectator is the highest moral authority and
reserves total moral knowledge exclusively for the Deity.
According to the interpretation I have been defending, the impartial spectator should be
understood as our best proxy for the divine will. The divine will prioritizes utility over other
goals, and constructed human nature in order to maximize this end. As limited creatures, we
cannot access God’s complete plan for the world and would be better off focusing on more
immediate concerns. In our attempt to do so well, we employ sentiments, rules, and imaginative
exercises which do not always respond directly to perceived utility but gain their moral
legitimacy due to their tendency to increase our well-being.

15
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RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS ABOUT RELIGION

So on the one hand, we see that the impartial spectator, whose judgments often appear to
be Smith’s ultimate criterion of right and wrong, does not determine the moral value of actions
mainly by analyzing their utility. On the other hand, Smith frequently allows utility to either
justify or override the impartial spectator. How do we reconcile these aspects of his philosophy,
and to what extent should we consider him a utilitarian? I propose that we can best understand
Smith’s views on this issue by examining his comments on religion. Smith incorporates
teleological and theological language throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and suggests
that we construct the impartial spectator out of characteristics given to us by God. The Deity
Smith refers to is a utilitarian, and designed us to promote the collective happiness of our
species. Our concept of the impartial spectator aids us in this effort, causing us to adopt the
moral attitudes which would most effectively further our welfare. We, however, do not always
consciously pursue the ends God sets out for us, and Smith does not advise us to. Thus, utility
acts largely indirectly in Smith’s theory, underwriting actions which we perform for a plethora of
complex reasons. I hope to demonstrate that this two-layered reading of utility’s place in Smith’s
work both fits in directly with Smith’s idea of God and accommodates his apparently
incompatible positions with respect to utilitarianism.
Smith draws on God largely to provide an origin story for our moral sentiments.
Although most of his book is devoted to a descriptive account of our psychological tendencies to
judge each other, Smith does not think that these tendencies just emerged contingently through a
process of evolutionary or cultural development. Instead, he maintains that “Upon whatever we
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suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason,
upon an original instinct, called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it
cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life” (III.5.6)
While Smith doesn’t explicitly refer to God here, he implies that some higher power designed
our mind and cares about our fate. Elsewhere, Smith more clearly specifies God as our creator
and adds that he has benevolent aims. As Smith writes:
the happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been
the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into
existence. No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity
which we naturally ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract
consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the examination of the
works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against
misery. But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily
pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may
therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in
our power the plan of providence (III.3.5.7)
This statement about God is still a very generic one, and does not imply that Smith is committed
to any particular religious sect. Although the question of what Smith’s personal religious beliefs
were remains controversial, his claims here and in the rest of The Theory of Moral Sentiments are
consistent with any monotheistic belief system. Also, we can begin to see here how Smith's
belief that the world is divinely ordered connects his moral psychology to an indirectly utilitarian
normative theory. Since God intended our moral faculties, which judge based on many other
factors besides utility, to be “the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind”,
our actions’ moral worth can derive from their utility even if we judge them using our
sentiments. Smith fleshes out this religious strain in his philosophy by detailing how the more
sophisticated elements of our morality helps us more closely mirror God’s judgment. As
explained earlier, Smith believes our moral sentiments are most reliable when they are filtered
through the perspective of an impartial spectator. This spectator expresses characteristically
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human attitudes when confronted with praiseworthy or blameworthy actions, but does so free of
the personal biases and unrelated emotional forces which distort our initial reactions. To Smith,
these advantages earn the impartial spectator the titles of “vicegerent of God” (III.5.6) and
“demigod within the breast” (III.2.32). Although one can interpret these honorifics as nothing
more than hyperbolic compliments for a mundane way to refine our moral perspicacity, they
might cohere better with Smith’s aforementioned views on religion if we take them to indicate
that there is a genuine connection between God and the impartial spectator. If Smith sees human
morality in general as a gift from above, the notion that the purest expression of our moral
sentiments contains a sacred aspect is a natural next step.
General rules are the other tool Smith suggests for correcting our moral instincts, and he
relates these to God as well. According to Smith, “those important rules of morality are the laws
and commands of the Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors
of their duty” (III.5.2). Like the impartial spectator, these rules acquire their holy imprimatur
from our sentiments. They are formed inductively, “from the experience we have had of the
effects which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us” (III.4.9), not proven
through reason or derived from first principles. Also like the impartial spectator, their main
purpose is to enable us to act on our consciences without interference from temperament or selfinterest. When the Deity created us, he instilled in us the capacity to sympathize with others,
which we use to measure the propriety of their feelings and actions. The pressure society
imposes on us to behave properly typically conduces to our aggregate well-being, as God
intended. Yet sometimes, due to a lack of knowledge or unwarranted preconceptions, an
individual acquires a reputation they do not deserve. In such cases, “an appeal lies from his
sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the
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supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast, the great
judge and arbiter of their conduct” (III.2.32). By imagining ourselves from this point of view and
determining the extent to which we sympathize with the action we performed, we render as
divine a verdict as is possible for us.
The impartial spectator is imperfect despite being formed from God-given sentiments.
Smith is careful to clarify that the impartial spectator is, “like the demigods of the poets, though
partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal extraction” (II.2.33). Even this spectator can be
swayed by the opinion of the masses, and, as we have seen, contains irregularities which threaten
to make it an inconsistent judge. Our general rules, too, cannot always tell us what we ought to
do. They excel at keeping us from falling below basic standards of decency or committing
genuine injustices, but are insufficiently precise to decide the harder ethical dilemmas. In fact,
Smith admits that “the general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine
what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, or gratitude, of friendship, are in many
respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that
it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them” (III.6.8). After
exhausting our resources for moral judgment, we may still be uncertain about what we ought to
do or whether one of our past actions was right. In these times, our only option is to “appeal to a
still higher tribunal, to that of the all-seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be
deceived, and whose judgments can never be perverted” (III.2.33). Possibly more than anywhere
else, Smith here rejects the idea that the impartial spectator is the highest moral authority and
reserves total moral knowledge exclusively for the Deity.
According to the interpretation I have been defending, the impartial spectator should be
understood as our best proxy for the divine will. The divine will prioritizes utility over other
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goals, and constructed human nature in order to maximize this end. As limited creatures, we
cannot access God’s complete plan for the world and would be better off focusing on more
immediate concerns. In our attempt to do so well, we employ sentiments, rules, and imaginative
exercises which do not always respond directly to perceived utility but gain their moral
legitimacy due to their tendency to increase our well-being.

5

RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS ABOUT UTILITY

I have hoped to establish so far that Smith believes God designed human morality so that
people would maximize their collective happiness without usually having that explicit goal in
mind but instead being motivated by moral emotions. I just addressed those who doubt this thesis
because they argue it overstates Smith’s religiosity. Now, I need to turn to the scholars who
instead reject it because they claim Smith was less of a utilitarian than I make him out to be. I am
dealing with the objections in this order because I believe the inclusion of God in Smith’s theory
is crucial for answering some of the criticisms made against utilitarian readings of his work.
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s article “Sentiments and Spectators: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy”
(2010) is particularly useful to examine here because he explicitly addresses the indirect
utilitarian theory I put forth in this thesis. In reference to this interpretation, Sayre-McCord
suggests that “Smith may be supposing that people perfectly properly regulate their moral
judgments by appeal to the standard set by the impartial spectator, having no further end in view,
even though it is the resulting contribution to public welfare and to the happiness of mankind that
justifies our judging this way” (p. 17). His main problem with this idea is that the moral worth of
utility-promoting behavior is still influenced by the context in which it occurs and not merely by
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the amount of happiness it produces or by its long-term effects. Sayre-McCord makes this point
by writing that “Smith rejects the idea that happiness, no matter whose, no matter how secured,
is valuable. That someone might take pleasure in some activity is no defense of that activity, if
that pleasure is improper, nor does the fact that some activity might promote happiness work to
justify that action, if the happiness depended on doing something wrong” (p. 17). If nonconsequentialist considerations can override aggregate happiness in Smith’s determination of the
ultimate value of someone’s conduct, it becomes hard to define him as a utilitarian of any sort.
In a two-level moral theory like the one I ascribe to Smith, the question of the worth of
any action hinges on whose perspective it is being assessed from. We judge someone’s actions as
morally right or wrong based on our sense of their propriety, which is the extent to which an
impartial spectator would find it a fitting response to the person’s situation. Since the impartial
spectator sometimes considers actions which decrease aggregate happiness appropriate or ones
which increase aggregate happiness inappropriate, the standards of propriety and utility can
reach different results. My contention is that God always prioritizes maximizing utility over
other goals, which means that relying on the moral faculties he gave us will tend to promote
utility. Smith states this most clearly when he insists that “All the inhabitants of the universe, the
meanest as well as the greatest, are under the immediate care and protection of that great,
benevolent, and all-wise Being, who directs all the movements of nature; and who is determined,
by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in it, at all times, the greatest possible quantity of
happiness” (VI.ii.3.5). This characterization of the divine will rules out the possibility that the
Deity would sacrifice someone’s happiness merely because it was acquired inappropriately if
doing so would not increase others’ happiness by a larger margin. Since everyone’s happiness,
regardless of how it was obtained, increases the total amount of it in the world, God must value it
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all. Although we place our standards of propriety alongside, and sometimes even ahead of,
determinations of utility to figure out what we approve of, God would contradict himself if he
ever allowed any other factor to override the utility calculus when he was designing the world.
To better understand the relationship between propriety and utility in Adam Smith’s
theory, it is worth analyzing his account of the virtues. Smith cites four principal virtues - justice,
benevolence, prudence, and self-command. These are the main character traits which we approve
of in others, try to inculcate in our children, and seek to acquire ourselves. An important test of
my reading of Smith is to see how these virtues relate to the pursuit of happiness. Does Smith
think that behaving virtuously necessarily redounds to the benefit of society as a whole? If and
when it doesn’t, does Smith have any advice on how to weigh the consequences of an act against
its virtuousness or lack thereof? Smith addresses the relationship between utility and virtue in his
comments on the history of philosophy in a way that makes it seem as though his virtue theory is
a problem for his utilitarianism. He writes that “the only difference between (a system based on
utility) and that which I have been endeavoring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not
sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure” or
the virtuous degree of a sentiment (VII.ii.4.1). If we read him here as saying that, for us, the
impartial spectator’s sympathy is the best way to tell what amount of each sentiment we should
display, I think this passage becomes consistent with my interpretation. As long as the virtuous
degree of each sentiment is the one which most effectively conduces to overall well-being, we
can read Smith as an indirect utilitarian. We will see that all the virtues tend to promote
happiness in general, but that there are certain times when behaving virtuously can have
undesirable consequences. Such cases appear somewhat troubling for the interpretation I have
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been promoting, but can be incorporated into my theory with the proper conception of the
function of our sentiments in a two-level moral system.
Of the four virtues, self-command can most easily conflict with the principle of utility.
Smith closely associates the other three with the happiness they bring about, claiming that “the
virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most
agreeable effects. Regard to those effects, as it originally recommends them to the actor, so does
it afterwards to the impartial spectator” (VI.conc.6). Smith admittedly implies elsewhere, for
example in his discussion of resentment and punishment, that non-consequentialist sentiments
sometimes help explain our judgments regarding these virtues as well, but overall the impartial
spectator behaves in line with utilitarian maxims when praising people for being prudent,
benevolent, or just. By contrast, Smith writes that “in our approbation of the virtues of selfcommand, complacency with their effects sometimes constitutes no part, and frequently but a
small part, of that approbation. Those effects may sometimes be agreeable, and sometimes
disagreeable; and though our approbation is no doubt stronger in the former case, it is by no
means altogether destroyed in the latter” (VI.conc.7). Although the first part of this statement,
that we approve of self-command for non-utilitarian reasons, fits into an indirect utilitarian
picture without much difficulty, his second claim that we actually approve of displays of selfcommand even when they are detrimental to society’s overall well-being represents a greater
departure from utilitarianism.
How exactly does self-command lead to bad consequences? The main cases where this
occurs, and the ones Smith brings up, arise when people use their ability to subdue their fear or
anger to more effectively carry out evil plans. Smith describes the negative side of self-command
by arguing that “the most intrepid valour may be employed in the cause of the greatest injustice.
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Amidst great provocations, apparent tranquility and good humour may sometimes conceal the
most determined and cruel resolution to revenge. The strength of mind requisite for such
dissimulation, though always and necessarily contaminated by the baseness of falsehood, has,
however, been often much admired by many people of no contemptible judgment” (VI.iii.12).
Even here, utility plays a significant role in our judgment process, as it renders our approval
more qualified that it would otherwise be. Still, Smith thinks that we naturally view their courage
as a redeeming feature, and that we should not be faulted for doing so. Even when we decide that
a brave or calm-tempered person is vicious on the whole, their self command remains a virtue just one that has been outweighed by their lack of benevolence or justness. A typical utilitarian,
on the other hand, would regard a dangerous person’s self-command as an exacerbating
characteristic. They would judge the self-controlled reprobate more harshly than the weak-willed
one, since the former can do more harm than the latter. Smith’s contrary tendency indicates that
utility need not always be the most important good for him.
We can understand why Smith finds it acceptable for us to approve of harmful behavior
by clarifying exactly what aspect of our moral psychology must be sensitive to utility-based
criteria. My claim is not that we always rank actions according to the nature of their results, but
just that our moral sentiments themselves consistently promote the greater good. The relevant
question, then, is whether it is beneficial to praise villainous characters for possessing a high
degree of self-command. Most important to recognize on this issue is Smith’s beliefs about how
crucial self-command is in general to the functioning of society. He argues that our ability to
control our actions based on a sense of propriety is so important that “without the restraint which
this principle imposes, every passion would, upon most occasions, rush headlong, if I may say
so, to its own gratification. Anger would follow the suggestions of its own fury; fear those of its
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own violent agitations” (VI.concl.2). Since self-command is such a valuable trait overall,
increasing its prevalence benefits society on net.
This benefit justifies our approbation of wicked but self-controlled individuals. Our
admiration for them is founded on an appreciation for their valuable skills, which in turn inspires
a desire to improve ourselves in that respect. As an example of this attitude, Smith describes how
“when a robber or highwayman is brought to the scaffold, and behaves there with decency and
firmness, though we perfectly approve of his punishment, we often cannot help regretting that a
man who possessed such great and noble powers should have been capable of such mean
enormities” (VI.iii.6). This reaction is precisely the one a utilitarian God would want us to have.
On the one hand, our respect for them does not prevent us from taking the necessary measures to
deter future crimes and protect the public, but on the other, our hope that better people will share
their most useful attributes means that some positive side effects can emerge from witnessing
their example.
My response to Sayre-McCord reveals how the two-level, God-based utilitarianism I
argue Smith endorses describes his theory more effectively than a straightforward utilitarian
interpretation would. Sayre-McCord understandably points out that Smith portrays our moral
judgment, even at its best, as multifaceted and sensitive to many factors other than utility. This
feature of his theory would completely contradict the idea that Smith is a direct utilitarian, since
if he were, he would have to regard non-utilitarian moral evaluations as errors. However, my
interpretation only requires Smith to think that each of our moral sentiments have an overall
positive utilitarian impact, not that each of our actions does. To demonstrate that Smith’s theory
meets this criteria, I discussed his four cardinal virtues, focusing on self-command. By
explaining how even Smith’s account of self-command, the least utilitarian virtue, is compatible
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with our creation by a utilitarian God, I showed why Sayre-McCord fails to rule out all utilitarian
interpretations of The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

6

CONCLUSION

The possibility for particular actions or character traits to count as virtuous despite failing
to promote collective happiness raises a broader question about what Smith takes to be the
criterion of morality. I’ve maintained throughout this paper that utility is the sole standard for
God’s judgment, whereas the impartial spectator, who values utility together with other factors,
is the standard for ours. But which of these standards actually determine what qualifies as a
moral action? One strategy would be to say that God, as an omniscient being, is always right
about morality, and so utility is the correct standard to use when evaluating actions. On that
view, the impartial spectator would simply be wrong when it issues non-utilitarian judgments,
even if we can recognize on reflection that it is good for it to judge this way. Relying on the
impartial spectator could still be our most reliable means for moral improvement, but it would
nonetheless be a fallible tool and not the true moral standard. The best textual evidence against
this interpretation comes when Smith compares morality to our other senses, and writes that
“what is agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit, and right, and proper to be done; the contrary
wrong, unfit, and improper. The sentiments which they approve of, are grateful and becoming:
the contrary, ungraceful and unbecoming. The very words, right, wrong, fit, improper, grateful,
unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases those faculties” (TMS III.5.5). Here, he is
explicitly defining morality in terms of our sentiments, and presumably primarily in terms of
those of the impartial spectator, since it most aptly expresses those sentiments. Under this
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definition, it is not possible to call an action we approve of wrong just because it doesn’t meet
utilitarian requirements for morality, even if God abided by those requirements in his own plan
of creation.
However, this approach might generate the concern that by defining morality so that it
can conflict with God’s own motives, we risk the implication that God is morally wrong when he
acts in ways which offend our sentiments. The idea that we could legitimately condemn the
Deity, and that we could do so using faculties he gave us, is unappealing for obvious reasons.
Additionally, admitting that the moral criterion differs from the principle of utility might
undermine my attempts to view Smith as a utilitarian, even an indirect one. I believe the best
way to look at this issue is to understand the impartial spectator’s reactions as determining which
actions are moral, but utility as ultimately explaining why we make the moral judgments we do
and why morality truly matters. The impartial spectator only finds some actions proper and
others improper because God thought it would benefit us if it did so. So, while generating the
sympathy of the impartial spectator is in an immediate sense what it means for an action to be
right, utility makes behavior right or wrong in the deeper sense that it is the reason we
sympathize with it or fail to do so in the first place.
Lastly, we can see how Smith connects the human standard of propriety to the divine
standard of utility through his description of our opinion of God’s moral status. While we cannot
morally judge God himself, we can decide whether or not we think following him is proper.
Smith argues that God passes our own test, declaring:
That our regard to the will of the Deity ought to be the supreme rule of our conduct, can
be doubted of by nobody who believes his existence. The very thought of disobedience
appears to involve in it the most shocking impropriety. How vain, how absurd would it be
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for man, either to oppose or to neglect the commands that were laid upon him by Infinite
Wisdom, and Infinite Power! How unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence
the precepts that were prescribed to him by the infinite goodness of his Creator, even
though no punishment was to follow their violation (III.5.12).
So, when we come to learn that God designed our moral faculties to promote utility, our devotion
to God leads us to view that as the chief end of our action. We continue to center our moral lives
around judgments of propriety, but we begin to do so mainly due to our faith that that is what
God would want from us and that he has our best interests in mind.
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